We present a model for optimizing the placement of sensors in municipal water networks to detect maliciously-injected contaminants. An optimal sensor configuration minimizes the expected fraction of the population at risk. We formulate this problem as an integer program, which can be solved with generally available IP solvers. We find optimal sensor placements for three real networks with synthetic risk and population data. Our experiments illustrate that this formulation can be solved relatively quickly, and that the predicted sensor configuration is relatively insensitive to uncertainties in the data used for prediction.
Introduction
In this paper we present a model for optimizing the placement of sensors in municipal water networks to detect maliciously-injected contaminants. Optimal sensor placement is required to ensure an adequate coverage of the network's flow for detection and remediation of contaminants. There are many possible objectives that could be formulated for optimal sensor placement, reflecting various costs and risks of an attack on a network. Previous work has focused on detection before a given volume of water has been consumed [7] and detection within a given time limit [8] . Additionally, Tryby et al. [10] present related work on the placement of disinfectant booster station.
We consider a sensor placement formulation for which optimal sensor configurations minimize the expected fraction of the population that is at risk for an attack. We model an attack as the release of a large volume of harmful contaminant at a single point in the network with a single injection. For any particular attack, we assume that all points "downstream" of the release point (connected by a set of directed edges) can be contaminated. In general, we do not know a priori where this attack will occur, so our objective is to place sensors to provide a compromise solution across a set of weighted attack scenarios.
We assume that water demands throughout a day are typically in one of a fixed set of patterns. The model makes no assumptions about how long each pattern holds, how often it appears, or the order in which the patterns appear. We use the water network simulator EPANET [9] to determine an acyclic water flow given a set of available water sources, assuming each demand pattern holds steady for sufficiently long. Thus demand/source set and flow are interchangeable concepts in this paper. We ignore the magnitude of water velocity in this model, requiring only its direction and that it be sufficiently large.
For each flow, each node is weighted by the number of people potentially consuming water at that point. We correlate flow patterns with approximate time of day to set these population numbers (e.g. to represent people at work during the day and at home in the evening). Note that these population numbers are not necessarily proportional to demand. For example, an industrial site could consume a lot of water although few people are on site.
We model our sensor placement problem as a mixed-integer program and solve it exactly. Attack scenarios are defined by probability distribution over all pairs of population-weighted flows and attack points (i.e. nodes in the network). This distribution must come from expert opinions, potentially taking into consideration knowledge of the network defenses (ease of access), location of assets within the network (e.g. location of a person or building that may be a likely target), degree of damage, and attacker psychology.
Section 2 describes an integer programming formulation for our sensor placement problem that can be exactly solved with standard branch-and-bound solvers. We exercise this model on three synthetic datasets. Section 3 describes our experimental design, and Section 4 summarizes the results of these experiments. In particular, we consider the sensitivity of the solution to perturbations in the data. In any real application, data such as population density and risk distribution will not be known with certainty, but our experiments suggest that our formulation is not particularly sensitive to these changes. Section 5 interprets these results, and in Section 6 we discuss limitations of the model, possible extensions, and formal complexity.
Integer Programming Model
In this section we give a more detailed description of the input data and formulate the problem as a mixed integer program. We wish to place a fixed number of sensors on the edges (pipes) of the network so as to minimize the percentage of "vulnerable" people over the weighted set of scenarios. We say that a person is vulnerable if there is a directed path from the attack point to them that has no sensor on it.
We model a water network as a graph G = (V, E). E is a set of edges representing pipes. V is a set of vertices, or nodes, where pipes meet. Vertices can represent sources, such as reservoirs or tanks, where water is introduced, and sinks (demand points) where water is consumed. In general, the network is represented at some scale or granularity, where nodes represent neighborhoods or regions of a city. Each pipe connects two vertices v i and v j and is usually denoted (v i , v j ). Most water networks are highly structured topologically. For practical purposes it is safe to assume they are planar. That is, they can be drawn in the plane such that no edges cross (though of course they can meet at nodes).
We consider risk under a fixed number of flow patterns, where we require only the direction of the flow on each edge. Thus a flow specifies for each edge (v i , v j ), (connecting vertex v i to v j ), whether the flow is i-to-j, j-to-i or essentially zero (based on a minimal threshold for the flow). We require the following input data:
• G = (V, E), the network. V = v 1 , . . . v n and E = e 1 , . . . e m .
• α ip , the probability of an attack at node v i during flow pattern p conditional on exactly one attack on a node during some flow pattern. We have v i ∈V,p∈1...P α ip = 1, where P is the number of flow patterns.
• δ ip , the density (number of people) at node v i while flow p is active. One can replicate a flow and associate multiple population densities with it, for example, when flows are associated with time periods and appear multiple times in a day. δ ip = 0 if node v i is not a demand node during flow f .
• f ijp ≡ f ep ∈ {0, 1}. These parameters describe flow pattern p. f ijp = 1 if there is positive flow along (directed) edge e = (v i , v j ) during flow pattern p and are 0 otherwise. We have f ijp f jip = 0. That is, water cannot flow in both directions of a pipe.
• S max , the maximum number of sensors we can place.
Given a single attack on node v i during flow pattern p, a node v j = v i is contaminated if there is a path from v i to v j where all edges have positive flow during flow p and no sensor. More specifically, v j is contaminated if there is a path
) ∈ E and f k(k+1)p = 1 for all k = 1 . . . l − 1 and we place no sensors on any edge in the path. If a demand node v j is contaminated during flow p, then all the people at node v j during time p are exposed. We wish to minimize the expected number of exposed people.
We model and solve this problem as a mixed-integer program (MIP). A MIP is the minimization (or maximization) of a linear objective function subject to a set of linear and integrality constraints on the variables. In this case, the integrality constraints represent decisions. That is, a sensor can only be placed on an edge or not. It is generally easy to extend MIP models to more complex settings, though doing so in a manner than will enable efficient solution of large problems can be more challenging.
In practice, many MIPs are solved exactly using intelligent search (branch and bound). There are a number of commercial and free software packages for solving MIPs such as CPLEX (an iLog product) and PICO [3] . Generic branch and bound for MIPs uses linear programming (LP) as a lower bound, obtained from the original MIP by relaxing the integrality constraints. LP is efficiently solvable theoretically and in practice via a number of LP codes including CPLEX and CLP [4] . Branch and bound grows a search tree where the root (start) is the original problem. If the solution to the LP relaxation has integral values for all the integral variables, this is a feasible optimal solution and we say the problem solves at the root. Otherwise, we select an integral variable (in our case an edge-selection variable) that is fractional in the LP optimal and branch, creating two subproblems which are solved similarly: one where we are forced to place a sensor on the given edge and one where we are forbidden to do so. Subproblems are pruned from the tree when they cannot produce an optimal solution (e.g. the LP relaxation has no solution or has a value higher than a known feasible solution). In practice this pruning is quite efficient. We use the number of subproblems (search tree nodes) to measure the complexity of solving the MIP.
The IP to solve our sensor-placement problem introduces the following variables:
• Decision variable s ij = 1 if we place a sensor on (undirected) edge (i, j) and 0 otherwise. A sensor on edge (i, j) detects contaminants moving in either direction. For ease of exposition, we will use both variables s ij and s ji , but they will be equal and, as a pair, represent the placement of only one sensor.
• Derived variables c ipj = 1 if node v j is contaminated by an attack at node v i during time period p, and 0 otherwise.
The IP is:
The first set of constraints ensures that when a node is directly attacked, it is contaminated. The second set indicates that a single sensor covers a pipe for flow in both directions. The third set propagates contamination from a node v k to a node v j if node v k is contaminated, there is positive flow along a directed edge from v k to v j and there is no sensor on that edge. The next constraint enforces the limit on total number of sensors. The final set forces integrality of the sensor-placement decisions. If these variables are set integrally, then the contamination indicator variables c ipj are also integral, even though they are not explicitly forced to binary values in the IP. The objective function exerts pressure to minimize these variables. The first and third set of constraints propagate values of 1 whenever there are no sensor to prevent the propagation (otherwise the contamination variables can stay at 0).
Methods
We have evaluated our sensor-placement strategy experimentally using two networks from the EPANET set and one real network. Because information on population density and risk was unavailable for the EPANET network and only partially available for the other, we used plausible synthetic data for this input data. For each of these datasets, we used EPANET to determine flow patterns during four six-hour time periods within a twenty-four hour time period. We will sometimes use "time period" interchangeably with "flow pattern" in the following discussion. Dataset 1 The first data set was adapted from "Example Network 2" provided with EPANET 2.0. This network has 36 nodes and 40 pipes, with one pump station. The nodes in this dataset were divided into four fictitious categories: pump station, residential neighborhood, business district, and industrial district. We considered twelve different sensor placement problems for this dataset. In each problem, one of the four groups of nodes was considered at risk (four attack scenarios), and the sensor limit was either 3, 5, or 7. To create an attack distribution, we selected four flow patterns: one from each six-hour time periods in a 24-hour EPANET simulation. We assumed a constant population of 500 across all of the nodes in each time period, with shifts between nodes that reflect the likely behaviors of a typical town. The relative probability of attack across nodes is constant within each attack scenario: the node group at risk has uniformly high probability, and all other nodes have very low probabilities. The relative (total) probability of each flow pattern is weighted by the perceived likelihood that a attack would be successful within that time period; for example, if a residential neighborhood is at risk, an attack is more likely during the day than in the evening, when more people are in the neighborhood. Dataset 2 We adapted the second dataset from "Example Network 3" provided with EPANET 2.0. This network has 97 nodes and 117 pipes, with 2 reservoirs and 3 tanks. We partitioned the nodes in this dataset into five fictitious categories: residential neighborhood, the mall, downtown neighborhood, industrial district, and other. The experiments were identical to those with dataset 1 except that the population, still constant through time, was 200000. Dataset 3 The third dataset was adapted from a local area network. This network has 470 nodes and 621 pipes, with 3 pumps and 4 tanks. The nodes in this dataset were divided into three fictitious categories: residential neighborhood, business district, and industrial district. We considered six sensor-placement problems where the number of sensors was either 10, 50, 100, 150, 250 or 300. We assume a maximum total population of 7600, though we did not keep this number constant within each time period. In each time period, all of the three groups of nodes were considered at risk, though with different relative probabilities. Thus the the relative probability of attack at each node depends on the time of day as well as the relative probabilities of attack for the sets of nodes. This represents a blending of the individual (category-based) attack scenarios.
For each of the problems defined by datasets 1, 2 and 3, EPANET 2.0 was used to calculate the flow directions for the attack scenarios. Dataset 1 has relatively few changes in its flows from one time period to the next. In this dataset, the network is almost linear (chainlike), and since it has only one water source, water simply flows from one end to another. Dataset 2 has many gross shifts in its flows, since water enters the network from two distinct sources. Changes in demand thus lead to some gross shifts in the water flow. Dataset 3 also has many changes in the network flow. However, the neighborhood, business and industrial nodes in this network are somewhat segregated, so changes in network flows tend to be very localized.
We used the AMPL modeling language [5] to formulate the integer program (SP1). In all cases, this IP was solved using AMPL 8.0, which applied the CPLEX 8.0 IP solver. These tools were run on Solaris and Linux workstations. We measured the efficacy of our solution by considering the run time as well as the expected percentage of the maximum population that is at risk for the optimal solution.
We expect that it will be difficult to assess the population densities and attack risks in real-world applications accurately. Consequently, we have also studied the sensitivity of our model to uncertainties in this data. More specifically, we consider how the value of the optimal solution and predicted sensor configuration change given changes in the population density and attack risks. We consider three noise levels: 5%, 10% and 25%. For each problem, each element of the population densities and risk probabilities were altered by multiplying by a uniformly distributed value in [1.0−ǫ, 1.0+ǫ], where ǫ is the noise level. The population densities and risk probabilities were then renormalized to ensure that the total population size was not changed in any attack scenario and that the total risk probabilities sum to one. Let us define an experiment to be a set of trials of our integer programming model for a fixed dataset, attack scenario, noise level, and number of sensors. The experiments for Datasets e24  e23  e22  e21e19  e17  e16  e15  e13  e12  e11  e10  e9  e8  e6  e5  e4  e3  e2  e0  0  0  2  0  7   <16,19>  <5,6>  <17,18> <23,25> <27,29>   <23,25> <27,29>  <17,18>  <5,6>  <3,4> (a) (b) (c) Figure 1 : Graphical representation of (a) a noiseless optimal placement, (b) an optimal placement in the presence of noise, and (c) the weighted bipartite graph used to compute the distance between the placements 1 and 2 each consisted of thirty trials, while those for the larger Dataset 3 each comprised five trials.
To measure the sensitivity of the optimal sensor configuration, we defined a distance measure between two sensor placements and compared each trial (optimization under noise) to the baseline without noise. This distance was defined by matching sensors in one configuration to the sensors in another. For each pair of sensors that are matched, the distance between those sensors is the number of nodes that are traversed in the shortest path between their two pipes within the water network. Further, the distance of the entire matching can be summed over all pairs of sensors in the matching. Consequently, we can define a distance measure between two sensor placements to be the value of the minimal matching between the two sensor placements, divided by the number of sensors in each configuration. This measure can be efficiently computed using a minimum-weight bipartite matching algorithm [2] , with nodes corresponding to the two sets of sensor placements and edge weights corresponding to the distance between each sensor pair.
For example, consider Figure 1 . Figure 1a shows an optimal placement of sensors for the experiment consisting of an attack on residential districts in which the network is protected by 5 sensors. Figure 1b shows the optimal placement in the presence of slightly perturbed data, while Figure 1c depicts the weighted bipartite graph constructed to compute the distance, which in this case is 9/5. We used the LINK system [1] to perform these computations and create custom graphics.
Numerical Results
Tables 1a, 1b and 1c summarize the values of the optimal solutions found for datasets 1, 2 and 3. These results confirm that the expected percentage of the population that is at risk goes down as the number of sensors is increased. For these data sets, a large fraction of the population can be protected even with a limited number of sensors.
Tables 1a, 1b and 1c also summarize the number of subproblems CPLEX 8.0 required to solve the corresponding IP. In many cases these problems were solved at the root of the branch-and-bound tree. Thus simply solving a linear program is sufficient to solve the IP in these cases. The run time to solve the IP in these experiments varied significantly with the problem size. For datasets 1, 2 and 3, these problems were solved on average within a second, a minute and a half hour respectively. Furthermore, in preliminary experiments we had difficulty solving substantially larger problems than dataset 3, which we suspect was due to memory limitations on our workstations; CPLEX used nearly 900 megabytes of RAM when solving dataset 3 on our Linux workstation.
The optimal solution value (percentage of the population that is at risk) showed very little sensitivity to noise for all three datasets. In virtually all cases, the mean value of the modified problem was within 0.1% of the baseline value (and usually within 0.05%). The variance of the modified problem values was also quite low. Even with noise levels of 25%, variance was almost always at or below 0.02%.
However, the configuration of the optimal solution did exhibit sensitivity to noise. The data in table 2 demonstrates that with increasing uncertainty in the data the uncertainty in the predicted sensor configuration increases. As the noise level increases, the average distance from the baseline solution increases as well as the variance of this distance. However, even for noise levels of 25%, the average distance is less than 2 in all cases. Thus we should expect to move each sensor at most two edges from our baseline solution configuration even when the input data for the model changes by as much as 25%.
As a function of number of sensors, for datasets 1 and 3, sensor placement sensitivity to noise at all tested levels and all scenarios consistently climbs to a peak at some middle value of number of sensors, and then drops as the number of sensors climbs. Dataset 2 shows this trend weakly, except for scenario 4. We'll discuss a plausible explanation in Section 5.
Discussion
In this section we present possible explanations for the data from our pilot study and discuss some implications and directions for further study. One plausible explanation for the rise, then decline of sensor-placement sensitivity is that the number of sensors falls into one of three regimes with respect to the network and data sets. With very few sensors, the best strategy is to protect the most valuable asset(s). Eventually, with more sensors, there are more choices for secondary assets to protect, and these choices may be quite sensitive to variations in attack point and population. Finally, when there are enough sensors to essentially protect everything, sensors are always placed in core locations. Verifying regime changes and predicting their location (number of sensors) as a function of network and data set is a topic for further study. Some networks may show multiple regime changes depending upon the number of major, localized assets.
The low sensitivity of the objective function implies that one may be able to predict a reasonable sensor budget as a function of desired protection level. However, it may be difficult to determine a single set of sensor locations that will work for a variety of related datasets. In a setting where sensor placement is sensitive, network planners may prefer a formulation that explicitly addresses data uncertainties. One possible method is to incorporate the noise into additional attack scenarios. However, one must then tolerate sparse sampling or solve huge problem instances. Another possibility is to find a solution that uses a limited number of additional sensors to guarantee robustness. For example, for a goal number of sensors g s , place g s + k in such a way that this static sensor placement performs as well as a mobile set of g s , always (near) optimally placed sensors would perform.
Finding an optimal sensor placement for full-sized networks containing 100000 or more nodes is likely to require parallelization using, for example,the PICO massively-parallel MIP code [3] . Parallel LP solvers are being incorporated into PICO, which will enable the solution of MILPs whose LP solves are too large for workstations. PICO also has facilities for exploiting structure to speed search and reduce the number of subproblems. An analyst can stop the computation early once a solution is provably optimal within a desired tolerance.
In Section 4, we normalized the optimal number of people at risk by the maximum population. A better normalization factor is the value of the IP with zero sensors, the average number of people exposed within a particular attack scenario. This normalization would enable fair comparisons between the solutions generated for different datasets.
Conclusions
The model presented in this paper makes many simplifications and assumptions that might need to be revised for practical applications. The biggest limitation in the model is lack of explicit modeling of time. The current model is pessimistic because contamination could travel slowly or decay, and hence some downstream consumers may not be at risk. It also does not consider switches in flow during an attack. This would act like a large set of initial contamination points for the subsequent flow, though these sources would be transient; the true attack point could then be sending new contamination elsewhere in the network. One may be able to model this situation as an IP, but it will require considerable data about flow patterns and contaminant properties and it is likely to be much more difficult to solve for a given network size.
We could generalize our current model to allow multiple attack points (still steady through a flow). We would then interpret the α if as weights, generically representing "likelihood" or a "worry factor", because calculating actual expected exposure will become more complex than is merited by our confidence in the values of α if .
In this paper, we place sensors on edges, though one could easily modify the IP to place sensors on vertices or on a mixture of both edges and vertices. We have also limited the number of sensors, but one could easily have a cost to place a sensor that could vary by location and/or sensor type with a limit on total budget. Another generalization would be to allow sensors to detect contaminants with a particular probability, though this would likely require a very different IP formulation.
The IPs for the datasets in this paper are extraordinarily easy, with most solving at the root or with very few subproblems. We have proved that the problem is NP-complete for general graphs. We conjecture that the formal complexity of the problem is significantly reduced for planar graphs. There may be a (pseudo)polynomial-time algorithm in this case. For example, a number of network partitioning problems are easier for planar graphs than they are for general graphs [6] .
